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PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, MARKET DYNAMICS AND THE VALUE 




This paper provides a comprehensive evidence on how product and market dynamics affect the 
value relevance of trade payables. Using a sample of 2,559 UK listed firms over the period 
2005-2014, we find a positive relationship between trade payables and firm performance. Our 
evidence suggests that trade payables increase (decrease) performance in firms with 
differentiated products and demand uncertainty (larger market share). We demonstrate that the 
relative value relevance of EDQNFUHGLWYHUVXVVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLVGHSHQGHQWRQWKHQDWXUHRIthe 
product, the level of sales volatility, and market share. We use an innovative approach to assess 
the robustness of our results to omitted variable bias. 
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1. Introduction  
6XSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLVWKHPDLQVRXUFHRIILQDQFHIRUPDQ\ILUPVDURXQGWKHZRUOG'HPLUJXF-
Kunt and Maskowitz, 1999). In fact, in the UK, firms buy over 80% of their merchandise on 
FUHGLW3HHOHWDO+RZHYHUWKHXELTXLWRXVXVHRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLVSX]]OLQJEHFDXVH
relative to institutional finance, it is more expensive (Yang, 2011; Lin and Chou, 2015). 
In explaining why ILUPVXVHVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWstudies either argue from the effect on 
market valuation or on other operational imperatives. The market valuation argument mainly 
focuses RQ WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ FRQWHQW RI VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW DQG KRZ LW LPSDFWV upon market 
valuation by signalling the private information of one stakeholder to another. For example, Goto 
et al. (2015) argued that relative to financial institutions, suppliers have a significant 
LQIRUPDWLRQDGYDQWDJHDERXWERUURZHUV¶IXWXUHJURZWKSURVSHFWV&RQVHTXHQWO\ their evidence 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWVLJQDOVIDYRXUDEOHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHEX\LQJILUP¶VIXWXUH
VDOHV JURZWK DQG LPSURYHV VXEVHTXHQW VWRFN UHWXUQV 6LPLODUO\ DUJXLQJ IURP D ERUURZHU¶V
perspective, Aktas et al. (2012) opined that relative to cash credit, trade credit is illiquid and 
less likely to divert. Accordingly, trade credits may LPSURYH ILUPV¶ PDUNHW YDOXDWLRQ E\
VLJQDOOLQJ PDQDJHUV¶ SULYDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKHLU ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW TXDOLW\ WR RXWVLGH
investors. On the contrary, studies that focus on the operational imperatives are mainly 
FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLQILUPVWKDWRSHUDWHXQGHUcertain product and 
market dynamics. For example, these studies mainly argue that trade credits are more important 
for the operations of firms with a greater need for inventory optimization management 
(Bougheas et al., 2009), long-term customer relationships (Wilson and Summers, 2002), and 
with demand uncertainty (Petersen and Rajan, 1997), among others. The central question in this 
SDSHULVZKHWKHUWKHVHRSHUDWLRQDOLPSHUDWLYHVJRYHUQWKHPDUNHWYDOXDWLRQRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW
:H VKRZ WKDW WKH PDUNHW YDOXDWLRQ RI VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW YDULHV XQGHU GLIIHUHQW RSHUDWLRQDO
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conditions and that the relative performance effects of trade credits and institutional finance are 
dependent on certain product and market dynamics. 
 'LYHUVLRQ PRWLYH WKHRU\ VXJJHVWV WKDW VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW VKRXOG LPSDFW SRVLWLYHO\ RQ
performance because it allows firms adequate time to assess the quality of inputs (Giannetti et 
al., 2011; Mateut et al., 2015). Similarly, from an operational motive theory perspective, 
VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLPSURYHVRSHUDWLQJHIILFLHQF\WKURXJKWKHVHSDUDWLRQRISD\PHQWIURPGHOLYHU\
(Ferris, 1981; Nelson and Nelson, 2002). Consequently, firms with demand volatility will 
require more trade payables (Martinez-Sola et al., 2014). Thus, with demand volatility firms 
face two peculiar problems: either to vary production to suit demand or fluctuate selling price 
to reflect demand (Martinez-Sola et al., 2014). However, each strategy is very costly. For 
example, a variation in production will lead to high production costs, while a variation in selling 
price will lead to a high information search cost for buyers (Martinez-Sola et al., 2014). All 
WKHVHZLOOKDYHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUDILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFH$VVXFKILUPVZLWKYDULDEOHGHPDQGFDQ
smooth production by demanding more credit from suppliers. In that case, a firm will enjoy 
stable production, which should minimise the cost of production and increase performance. 
Long et al. (1993) found a positive relationship between trade payables and demand uncertainty. 
We re-H[DPLQHWKHYDOXHUHOHYDQFHRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWDQGH[SORUHKRZWKLVYDULHVLQILUPV
with different levels of demand uncertainty.  
 Trade payables are crucial to the performance of firms vying for market share. This is 
because firms extend more credit to customers in order to increase market share (Nadiri, 1969; 
Hill et al., 2012). However, the amount of credit firms give to customers is a function of how 
much credit they receive from suppliers (Love et al., 2007; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Hill et 
al., 2012).  In other words, firms that give more credit to customers also demand more credit 
from their suppliers (Fabbri and Menichini, 2010). This is because firms finance part of their 
trade receivables with trade payables (Molina and Preve, 2009; Aktas et al., 2015). This means 
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that trade payables may be more important to firms trying to increase market share through 
trade credit since they will need to finance credit to customers (Atanasova, 2007). Our study 
considers how market share may impact on the trade payables-market valuation relationship. 
 Firms with differentiated inputs may have a greater need for trade payables (Mateut et 
al., 2015). This is because firms need more time to verify the quality of differentiated inputs 
(Fabbri and Menichini, 2010). Further, sellers and producers of differentiated products have 
stronger supplier relationships because they have fewer alternative suppliers (Mateut et al., 
2015) and thus receive more supplier trade credits than those with standardised goods (Giannetti 
et al., 2011). Accordingly, the diversion theory suggests that trade credit usage is correlated 
with the nature of goods being traded (Mateut et al., 2015). Trade payables are therefore 
expected to be more important for firms with differentiated products than those with 
standardised products (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). We study the value relevance of suSSOLHUV¶
credit in firms with differentiated products. 
 Using a comprehensive sample of 2,559 UK firms for the period 2005 to 2014, this 
paper finds support for the conjecture that VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW positively impacts upon firm 
performance. The findings inGLFDWHWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLVYDOXHUHOHYDQWLQILUPVZLWKVDOHV
volatility and differentiated products, but value decreasing in firms with bigger market share. 
2QWKHFRQWUDU\VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWRQO\increases performance in firms with bigger market share 
during the crisis period. Further, although institutional finance is more value relevant than 
VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWWKLVLVRQO\FRQVSLFXRXVLQILUPVZLWKORZGHPDQGXQFHUWDLQW\DVZHOODVWKRVH
with small market share and standardised products. In firms with high demand uncertainty, 
larger market share and differentiated products, institutional finance is not value relevant. The 
results are robust to endogeneity and alternative proxies. 
  The first unique contribution we make to the trade credits literature is the finding that 




demand uncertainty, differentiated products and market share has long been recognized in the 
trade credits¶ literature (Emery, 1987; Hill et al., 2010; Hill et al., 2012; Bougheas et al., 2009; 
Fabbri and Menichini, 2010; Martinez-Sola et al. 2014; Mateut et al., 2015). However, research 
RQKRZWKHVHPD\DIIHFWWKHSHUIRUPDQFHHIIHFWVRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWVUHPDLQVFDUFH$OWKRXJK
we focus on market valuation, our findings are also germane to researchers and managers 
LQWHUHVWHGLQRWKHUFRQVHTXHQFHVRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWV7KHUHVXOWimplies that in examining the 
HIIHFW RI VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW RQ RWKHU firm-level outcomes, the different products and market 
dynamics that firms face should also be considered.  In addition to its theoretical importance, 
Aktas et al. (2012) demonstrated theoretically how the performance effects of trade credits 
emanate from their DELOLW\WRVLJQDOPDQDJHUV¶SULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQWRRXWVLGHLQYHVWRUV7KH\
argued that relative to cash, suppliers¶ credit is illiquid and less likely to divert. Therefore, 
VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWPD\ LQFUHDVHPDUNHWYDOXDWLRQE\VLJQDOOLQJPDQDJHUV¶FRPPLWPHQWQRW WR
expropriate. By extension, our findings indicate that product differentiation and demand 
uncertaint\ELJJHUPDUNHWVKDUHLQFUHDVHUHGXFHWKHVLJQDOVWUHQJWKRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWDQG
ultimately enhance (diminish) its performance effects. This interpretation is in consonance with 
arguments in signalling and information asymmetry theory that signal honesty (dishonesty) 
increases (decreases) signal strength and improves (impair) the effect of the signal on the 
receiver (Connelly et al., 2011).  
The second unique contribution we make to the literature is the finding that the relative 
value relevance of suSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWYHUVXVLQVWLWXWLRQDOILQDQFHKLQJHVRQPDUNHWVKDUHQDWXUH
of product and level of demand uncertainty. The existing literature is almost unanimous in 
finding that institutional finance is cheaper (Yang, 2011; Lin and Chou, 2015) and has greater 
performance effect (Du et al., WKDQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW7KLVLVGXHWRWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKH
UHOLDQFH RQ VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW LV PRUH LPSRUWDQW WR ILUPV RSHUDWLQJ LQ GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV
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because of the underdeveloped nature of the financial sector (Cull et al., 2009; Ge and Qiu, 
2007). However, although other studies show that firms residing in developed countries equally 
UHO\RQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW 3HWHUVHQDQG5DMDQ3HHl et al., 2000, Ferrando and Mulier, 
2013), the existing literature mainly focuses on trade receivables (see, Hill et al., 2012; 
Martinez-Sola et al., 2014). We contribute to the literature by documenting that institutional 
finance is more value relevant than suppliers¶ credit in firms with bigger market share.  
However, iQ ILUPVZLWK GLIIHUHQWLDWHGSURGXFWV DQGGHPDQGXQFHUWDLQW\ VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW LV
more value relevant than institutional finance. This finding has implications for managers in 
making inventory-financing decisions. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical and empirical literature on trade payables and firm performance and develops 
hypotheses. The study data and research design are discussed in Section 3. The empirical results 
are discussed in Section 4 and Section 5 discusses several further analyses. The robustness tests 
are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theory, Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1 Trade payables and firm performance: Theoretical framework 
Many theories, including financing theory, diversion motive theory, transaction cost theory and 
recently, signalling and information asymmetry theory, have established a link between trade 
payables and firm performance. Financing theory (Emery, 1984; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; 
Bhattacharya, 2008) suggests a positive association between trade payables and performance. 
This theory argues that inefficiencies in financial markets lead to credit rationing (Van den 
Bogaerd and Aerts, 2015) which prevents firms from accessing the needed funds to finance 
their operations (Emery, 1984; Petersen and Rajan, 1997); tKDW LVVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWDFWVDVD
complement to bank credit (Kohler et al., 2000; Van den Bogaerd and Aerts, 2015). The theory 
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explains that firms rely on trade payables as an important source of short-term finance (Cook, 
1999) because it shields them from inefficiencies in the capital markets (Ferrando and Mulier, 
2013).  
 The diversion theory of trade credit provision argues that the level of trade credit 
UHFHLYHGIURPVXSSOLHUVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHSURGXFW¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFV&XQDW*LDQQHWWLHW
al., 2011; Mateut et al., 2015). According to this theory, suppliers of differentiated products are 
more willing to sell on credit than suppliers of standardised products because of the amount of 
time needed by the buyer to inspect differentiated inputs (Mateut et al., 2015).  This theory also 
argues for lengthy credit periods for differentiated products because buyers are less able to 
divert the use of items purchased, given their unique nature (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). It, 
therefore, suggests a lower moral hazard associated with differentiated products (Giannetti et 
al., 2011). A longer credit period will help such firms to fund RSHUDWLRQVXVLQJVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW
or invest the amounts in short-term opportunities such as treasury bills. 
The transaction cost theory of trade credit argues that the problem with the holding of 
both money and goods are reduced because trade credit makes it possible for firms to separate 
payment schedules from delivering schedules (Ferris, 1981). This theory argues for a higher 
performance of trade credit because suppliers and customers can reduce the cost of transactions 
between them by use of trade credit (Nelson and Nelson, 2002). Without trade credit, for 
example, buyers will have to immediately pay for goods and services on every occasion. This 
will lead to a higher cost of transferring cash to the supplier. Also, the theory predicts a higher 
performance for trade payables because it helps to smooth production cycles (Petersen and 
5DMDQHVSHFLDOO\LQILUPVZLWKVDOHVYRODWLOLW\:LWKVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWILUPVFDQDFWXDOO\
increase production to meet sales demand in peak periods by acquiring inputs of production 
immediately and paying for them in the future.  
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More recently, studies have used signalling and information asymmetry theory to 
H[SODLQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHHIIHFWVRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW6LJQDOOLQJWKHRU\describes the behaviour 
of two parties in the presence of information asymmetry (Spence, 2002). Thus, a party 
(signaller) uses an observable quality to signal an unobservable quality (private information) to 
another party (Zhang and Wiersema, 2009). Within signalling theory, suppliers¶FUHGLWcontains 
the private information of different stakeholders such as managers (Aktas et al., 2012) or 
suppliers (Goto et al., 2015). Therefore, their use signals the favourability of this information 
to outside investors who may, in response, adjust their valuation of the firm.  For example, 
because trade credits are less likely to divert than cash credits, managers use it to signal their 
commitment to the pursuit of shareholder interests to outside investors (Aktas et al., 2012). In 
response, investors may decode this signal and adjust their valuation for the firm upwards. 
6LPLODUO\*RWRHWDOQRWHWKDWVXSSOLHUVKDYHSULYDWHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHLUERUURZHU¶V
future sales growth. As a result, suppliers¶ credit signals the favourable information suppliers 
have about their customers. However, within signalling theory, a signal can be strong or weak 
(Gulati and Higgins, 2003) depending on whether the signaller has signal honesty ± the extent 
to which the signaller has the underlying quality associated with the signal. Accordingly, signal 
strength is determined by signal honesty or dishonesty which is also a function of the signaller 
(Zhang and Wiersema, 2009) so that the more signally honest (dishonest) the signaller is, the 
stronger (weaker) the signal strength, ceteris paribus.  Dishonest signals can be costly because 
although they may be ignored by the receiver, the signaller will still have to bear the cost of 
producing the signal (Connelly et al., 2011). 
       
2.2 Trade payables and firm performance: Empirical literature 
Although several studies have examined the effect of trade receivables on firm performance, 
only a handful of studies have empirically examined the relationship between trade payables 
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and firm performance. However, these studies mostly focus on emerging markets. This is due 
WR WKH DUJXPHQW WKDW UHOLDQFH RQ VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW LV PRUH LPSRUWDQW WR ILUPV RSHUDWLQJ LQ
developing countries because of the underdeveloped nature of the financial sector (Cull et al., 
2009; Ge and Qiu, 2007). Ge and Qiu (2007) use a sample of 570 state-owned and non-state-
RZQHGILUPVIURP&KLQDWRH[DPLQHWKHXVHRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWRQILUPSHUIRUPDQFH7KHLU
evidence shows that the non-state-owned firms have higher performance from more supplier 
credit use. Using a panel of 37 industries and 44 countries, Fisman and Love (2003) examined 
the impact of trade payables on industry growth. They find that industries with a higher degree 
RI GHSHQGHQFH RQ VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLt exhibit higher growth rates in countries with weaker 
financial institutions.  
 Li et al. (2016) use a survey of firms in China conducted by the World Bank in early 
2003 to examine the relationship between trade payables and firm performance. Using ordinary-
least-squares (OLS) estimations, their results show that trade payables are positively and 
significantly correlated with both labour productivity and return on assets (ROA). Nevertheless, 
they concluded that trade payables play a limited role in boosting firm performance, but suggest 
that they may have a long-run rather than short-run effect on firm performance. Using a sample 
of 1,566 firms from eight provinces in China, Du et al. (2012) record that trade payables 
improve firm performance but the magnitude is lesser than that of bank credit.  
 In developed countries where capital markets are relatively developed and efficient, 
VWXGLHVPDLQO\IRFXVRQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFRQWHQWRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW7KHVHVWXGLHVDUJXHWKDW
VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWPD\LPSDFWupon market valuation by signalling the private information of one 
group of stakeholders to the other. For example, using US data, Aktas et al. (2012) report a 
SRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWDQGVHYHUDOILUPOHYHOSUR[LHVLQFOXGLQJ]-score, 
ROA and long-run abnormal returns. They thus conclude that relative to bank credit, trade 
credits are less likely to be expropriated and that managers use them to signal their commitment 
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to quality investment and a desire not to expropriate shareholder wealth. Similarly, Goto et al. 
(2015) report that suppliers¶ credit assumes a positive relationship with both future sales growth 
and subsequent stock returns. They attribute their findings to the fact that suppliers¶ credit 
signals the favourable information suppliers have about their customers¶ sales growth potential, 
which also predicts stock returns. Another strand of the literature in developed countries 
contends that trade credit may be central to the operations of certain firms. For example, trade 
credits are crucial for the operations of firms in need of long-term customer relationships, 
(Bougheas et al., 2009) warranties for product quality (Long et al., 1993), and inventory 
optimization (Wilson and Summers, 2002), among others. 
  
        
2.3 Hypotheses development 
(i) Trade payables and firm performance 
$ ILUP¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW LV H[SHFWHG WR DIIHFW LWV SHUIRUPDQFH Shin and 
Soenen, 1998; Kestens et al., 2012; Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). Firms can externally finance 
production either by relying on bank credit or suppliers¶ credit (Goto et al., 2015). Even though 
some studies argue that relying on bank credit is by far cheaper than suppliers¶ credit (Ng et al., 
1999; Wilner, 2000; Kestens et al., 2012), other studies (Elliehausen & Wolken, 1993; Cook, 
1999; Giannetti et al., 2011; Nelson and Nelson, 2002) cast doubt on this claim. In fact, almost 
DOOILUPVUHO\RQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW3DXODQG%RGHQ7KHHYLGHQFHVRIDUVXJJHVWVWKDW
even firms with good standing with their banks still rely oQ VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW &RRN 
Fabbri and Menichini, 2010; Giannetti et al., 2011). In fact, Tsuruta IRXQGWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶
credit and bank loans are complements and not substitutes. This refutes the assertion that trade 
credit is used as a last resort, and suggests that firms use suppliers¶ credit as a strategic tool to 
increase performance. Yang (2011) argue that both financially constrained and unconstrained 
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firms rely on trade credit as a source of finance, although it is more pronounced in the latter. 
'HORRIRSLQHVWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWFDQEHDQLQH[SHQVLYHIRUPRIFUHGLt. According to 
Ferrando and Mulier (2013), firms manage their trade payables in order to optimize 
performance. 
 Firms use suppliers¶ credit to finance their trade receivables (Molina and Preve, 2009; 
Ferrando and Mulier, 2013). The use of trade payables to finance trade receivables may increase 
SHUIRUPDQFH EHFDXVH LW FDQ RIIVHW WKH ORVW LQWHUHVW DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ILQDQFLQJ FXVWRPHUV¶
purchases. Given that credit to customers represents an amount locked up in working capital 
(Ng et al., 1999), firms can improve their performance by releasing the amount locked up 
through the use of trade payables.  In support of this argument, Wu et al. (2012) provide 
empirical evidence that ILUPVWKDWUHO\RQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLQFUHDVHoperating cash flow. Firms 
that give credit to their customers try to balance it by also demanding credit from their suppliers 
(Molina and Preve, 2009). In fact, Fabbri and Menichini (2010) provide empirical evidence to 
suggest that firms match the maturity of their trade receivables and trade payables for risk 
management purposes. 
 7UDGH SD\DEOHV FDQ DOVR LQFUHDVH D ILUP¶V SHUIRUPDQFH WKURXJK HIILFLHQF\ VDYLQJV
(Wilson and Summers, 2002), as suggested by the transaction cost theory. According to the 
transaction cost theory, buying on credit and paying at a later date can help firms to accumulate 
all payments and pay in bulk (Ferris, 1981). In that case, a firm will save money on the cost that 
would have been incurred by transferring funds to the supplier for each purchase made; that is, 
trade payables separate the purchase cycle from the payment cycle, which reduces uncertainty 
via transaction pooling (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1993). Trade payables reduce the uncertainty 
of waiting for cash to be received by the supplier before goods or services are delivered.  
 Trade credit can also be used as an evaluation tool to increase firm performance (Smith, 
1987). The time gap allowed by a supplier can be a vital period where buyers can check the 
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quality of products. This reduces the time and effort in paying for goods and services and then 
requesting a refund. Avoiding the need to request a refund after making a payment is expected 
to increase firm performance via reduced transaction costs. Also, to the extent that trade credit 
is less liquid than cash credit, its usage signals managers¶ disincentive to expropriate wealth 
(Aktas et al., 2012). This indicates reduced principal-agent conflicts and improves firm 
valuation. It is therefore hypothesized that: 
H1 Trade payables are positively related to firm performance.  
 
(ii) Trade payables, sales volatility, and firm performance. 
+LJKHUGHYLDWLRQVLQVDOHVGHPDQGVKRXOGLQFUHDVHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWUDGHSD\DEOHVWRDILUP¶V
performance. A firm with sales volatility must use trade receivables to smooth sales (Hill et al., 
2012). However, research shows that firms that give out more credit to customers also depend 
PRUHRQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW%XUNDUWDQG(OOLQJVHQ/RYe et al., 2007; Ferrando and Mulier, 
2013); that is, the higher trade receivables as a result of sales volatility will trigger the need for 
firms to depend on trade payables. The matching of trade payables with receivables can help 
improve the cash flow of firms (Wu et al., 2012) and ultimately increase performance (Fabbri 
and Menichini, 2010). 
 From the transaction cost theory perspective, trade payables should improve the 
performance of firms with sales volatility through cost savings. The volatility of sales will lead 
to fluctuations in production, which will, in turn, result in erratic purchasing cycles.  Therefore, 
firms with erratic purchasing cycles as a result of sales volatility can improve performance by 
acquiring the necessary inputs of production, separate from the payment cycle (Nelson and 
Nelson, 2002). The separation of the payment cycle from the purchasing cycle is very important 
to the performance of firms with sales volatility because it obviates the need to hold 
precautionary cash balances and reduces transaction costs associated with cash management 
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(Ferris, 1981). Therefore, we expect firms with sales volatility to have higher trade payables 
performance than firms with stable demand. Following the above arguments, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H2:  The value relevance of trade payables is an increasing function of sales volatility. 
    
(iii) Trade payables, market share, and firm performance. 
Firms that need to increase their market share may have to rely more on trade payables to secure 
the necessary inputs for production.  This is because firms increase market share by giving more 
credit to customers (Hill et al., 2012), and firms finance part of their trade receivables with trade 
payables (Molina and Preve, 2009). Therefore, the incentive to increase sales will result in a 
UHOLDQFHRQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW+LOOHWDO. This view is also corroborated by Bougheas et 
al. (2009) as well as Fabbri and Menichini (2010). Credit sales need financing, however, firms 
with small market share have difficulties financing their credit sales with bank credit (Petersen 
and Rajan 1997; Nelson and Nelson, 2002; Baños-Caballero et al., 2014). This is because firms 
with small market share are usually small in size (Chen et al., 2014) and are associated with 
information asymmetry (Petersen and Rajan 1997). Nevertheless, these firms have higher 
growth opportunities due to their small market share and as such trade payables will help propel 
growth (increase sales) and result in higher performance. In contrast, firms with bigger market 
share have relatively fewer growth opportunities but greater access to bank credit (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997). Therefore, given that trade payables are more expensive and negatively related 
to bank credit (Lin and Chou, 2015), they will be value decreasing in firms with bigger market 
share because they lack growth opportunities.  In sum, these arguments lead to the following 
hypothesis: 




(iv) Trade payables, differentiated products and firm performance. 
6XSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWXVDJHLVFRUUHODWHGZLWKWKHQDWXUHRIWKHWUDQVDFWHGJRRGV(see, Smith, 1987; 
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Cuñat, 2007; Fabbri and Menichini, 2010; Giannetti et al., 2011; 
Mateut et al., 2015) and differentiated products are associated with more suppliers lending 
across industries (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Caglayan et al., 2012). Longer trade credit is a 
norm in industries that deal with differentiated products (Longhofer and Santos, 2003; Frank 
and Maksimovic, 2005). This is because the need to form supplier-buyer relationships leads to 
limited buyer opportunism (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) and lower moral hazard (Mateut et 
al., 2015).  This also implies that firms that buy differentiated inputs may not face the additional 
charges associated with credit from suppliers. Accordingly, Giannetti et al. (2011) conclude 
that for firms with differentiated products, trade payables are cheaper than bank credit. 
               Differentiated products require differentiated supplies or inputs. Consequently, both 
buyers and suppliers of differentiated products have a limited number of customers (Mateut et 
al., 2015). Wilson and Summers (2002) note that the use of trade payables is a vital tool to 
foster long-term supplier relationships. Therefore, in light of the limited number of suppliers, 
trade payables can increase performance in firms with differentiated products by nurturing good 
supplier relationships to ensure timely and adequate supply of inputs. More so, buyers of 
specialised inputs or materials require additional time from their suppliers to verify the quality 
before payment is made (Giannetti et al., 2011). Accordingly, Smith (1987) argues that buyers 
of differentiated inputs are always reluctant to make payment before quality is examined. 
However, trade payables provide a warranty for quality because they reduce the information 
asymmetry surrounding product quality (Long et al., 1993). Consequently, they will increase 
performance by reducing costs associated with the long input verification time required by 
producers of differentiated products. 
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 We, therefore, expect the value relevance of trade payables to be higher for firms with 
differentiated products than those with standardised products or service providers2.  Based on 
the arguments above, it is hypothesised that: 
H4:  The value relevance of trade payables is an increasing function of differentiated products. 
 
3. Sample, Data, and Methodology 
3.1 Sample selection and data 
Data for this study was sourced from the AMADEUS database. The sample consists of all listed 
firms on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 2005 to 2014. Similar to Deloof (2003) and 
Afrifa (2016), all financial firms are excluded. The final sample consists of 2,559 firms over 
the sample period. The unbalanced nature of our data helps alleviate possible selection and 
survivorship biases.  
 
3.2 Variable definitions 
The main dependent variable to be analysed is excess return. The use of excess return as a 
measure of firm performance is common in the trade credit literature (Hill et al., 2010; Aktas 
et al., 2015; Goto et al., 2015). The excess return is measured as the return on the buy-and-hold 
investment LQWKHVDPSOHILUPȓOHVVWKHUHWXUQRIWKHEX\-and-hold investment in the benchmark 
portfolio. The benchmark controls for possible influencing elements that can affect excess 
return. After these influencing factors have been controlled for, whatever is not explained is 
                                                            
2 This paper follows Hill et al. (2012) by separating the firms in the sample according to industry type: (1) 
standardized goods, (2) differentiated goods, services and (3), according to the UK SIC (2003) classification. To 
prevent selection bias, firms that are not included in any industry type are added to the standardized product 
industry. The results are quantitatively similar if unclassified firms are excluded. Standardised products include 
firms with UK SIC codes 1, 2, 7, 8-10, 12-17, 20-24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40, 43, 46, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 70, 72, 76, 
80, 81-84, 86-89, 91-97 and 99. Differentiated products include firms with UK SIC codes 25, 27, 30, 32 and 34-39. 
Services include 41, 42, 44, 45, 47-57, 59, 61, 65, 73, 75, 78 and 79. 
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abnormal. The excess return is computed as the buy-and-hold abnormal excess return using 
monthly return data. More specifically, the abnormal excess return is computed as: ௜ ൌ  ? ሺ ? ൅ ௜ܴ௧ሻି௧்ୀଵ  ? ሺ ? ൅ ௕ܴ௧ሻ௧்ୀଵ                         (1) 
   
Where ExcessRet, is the buy-and-KROGDEQRUPDOUHWXUQIRUVWRFNȓ5it is the rate of return for 
stock i on month t, Rbt is the rate of return for the benchmark for stock ȓ, and T is the investment 
horizon in a number of months. Following Aktas et al. (2015) and Hill et al. (2012), the Fama 
and French (1993) 5 X 5 size and book-to-market portfolio sorts are used as benchmark 
portfolios.  
 The main variable of interest is trade payables, which is scaled by the cost of goods sold 
(see, Love et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2012; Garcia-Appendini and Montriol-Garriga, 2013). Trade 
payables need differs from industry to industry (Hill et al., 2010), firm to firm (Aktas et al., 
2015), and from one year to another (Afrifa, 2016). Therefore, to examine the effect of trade 
payables on firm performance, it is necessary to account for firm, year and industry effects (see, 
Hill et al., 2012; Aktas et al., 2015); that is, the industry/year adjusted trade payables are used 
as the independent variable. To do this, the trade payables averages are calculated for each 
industry/year, after that the industry/year averages are netted from each firm's trade payables 
per each year (Aktas et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2010). This method accounts for industry, firm and 
year effects. The UK SIC 2003 industry classification is used to group firms into industries.  
  As the goal of this paper is to measure the effect of trade payables on firm performance, 
all regressions include control variables3 that have been widely used in the literature. Larger 
firms may benefit more from trade credit because of their bargaining power (Martinez-Sola et 
al., 2014). We, therefore, control for firm size (Ferrando and Mulier, 2013), defined as the log 
of total assets. We include annual sales growth because higher sales are expected to increase 
                                                            
3 The dummy variables DiffProd and Services were included in the main estimations. However, the coefficient 




profitability. Following Baños-Caballero et al. (2014), annual sales growth is defined as (Sales-
Salest-1)/Salest-1. Firms can increase performance as a result of increasing firm risk (Aktas et 
al., 2015). Firm risk (risk) is defined as the standard deviation of daily excess return (Aktas et 
al., 2015). Older firms may experience higher performance because of their long-standing 
relationship with suppliers (Baños-Caballero et al., 2010). Firm age (Age) is the difference in 
years between the date RILQFRUSRUDWLRQDQGHDFKILUP¶VFDOHQGDU\HDUHQG$IULIDDQG*\DSRQJ
2017). The WD[VKLHOGEHQHILWRIILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJH/HYHUDJHPD\KHOSWRLPSURYHDILUP¶V
performance (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Leverage is measured as the total debt divided by 
total assets (Aktas et al., 2015). We include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (Aktas 
et al., 2015) because firms with a higher proportion of intangible assets such as human capital 
may be able to use resources with maximum effectiveness (Harris and Robinson, 2001). Finally, 
cash flow is included in all regressions because firms with cash flow may increase performance 
by taking advantage of profitable venture. Cash flow is defined as operating income before 
extraordinary items + depreciation, scaled by total assets (Aktas et al., 2015). 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Preliminary data analysis was conducted to test for outliers in the samples. The method applied 
in this study was to winsorize all variables at the 0.5%. The decision to winsorize the affected 
data is in line with the similar procedure followed by previous researchers in the accounting 
and finance literature, including Kieschnick et al. (2006) and Hill et al. (2010).  
 To test hypothesis 1(Trade payables and firm performance), the following model is 




 To investigate the influence of sales volatility, market share, and product differentiation 
on the trade payables-firm performance relationship, the following specifications are proposed: 
 
To test hypothesis 2 (Trade payables, sales volatility, and firm performance) the following 
model is estimated: 
ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܥܸ ?݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ כܥܸ ?݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜௧ିଵ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௜௧               (3) 
 
To test hypothesis 3 (Trade payables, market share, and firm performance) the following model 
is estimated 
ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܯ݇ݐ݄ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ כܯ݇ݐ݄ܵܽݎ݁௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜௧ିଵ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௜௧                  (4) 
 
To test hypothesis 4 (Trade payables, differentiated products, and firm performance) the 
following model is estimated: 
ܧݔܿ݁ݏݏܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ כ ܵ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ߚଷܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ כ ܦ݂݂݅ܲݎ݋݀௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚସܵ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܦ݂݂݅ܲݎ݋݀௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜௧ିଵ ൅ܨ݅ݎ݉݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ܻ݁ܽݎ݂݂݁݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௜௧                                                                          (5) 
 
The dependent variable, ExcessRet LQ DOO UHJUHVVLRQV LV WKH ILUP¶V DQQXDO excess return. ܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ represents industry-adjusted trade payables. Controls refer to control variables 
included in the regressions. The subscript i = number of firms (2,559), and the subscript t = 
number of years (10). µ i XQREVHUYDEOHKHWHURJHQHLW\DQGİit = error term. The right-hand side 
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variables of equations (2)-(5) are lagged by a one-year period to reduce the effect of 
simultaneity.  Consistent with Petersen (2009), heteroscedasticity is accounted for by clustering 
the standard errors at the firm level 
   All variables are defined in Table 1.   
 [INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
4.      Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The results show that the excess return of the 
average firm in the sample is 1.4023%, which is similar to the 1.89% reported by Muradoglu 
and Sivaprasad (2012) in the UK. The median and standard deviation are 2.0378% and 
3.8918%, respectively. The standard deviation figure shows a substantial variation in the excess 
return of the firms in the sample. The median excess return is much higher relative to the mean, 
indicating that the excess return distribution is negatively skewed. The mean of the industry 
adjusted trade payables is 0.00004 with a median of 2.5751. The average firm has a sales 
volatility of 16.7905%, which provides evidence of the presence of demand uncertainty of the 
firms in the sample. This is, however, lower compared with the figure of 31.12% reported by 
Hill et al. (2010). The market share of the average firm in the sample is 0.1436%, indicative of 
the competitive environment in which the firms are operating. The univariate results show that 
the majority of the firms in the sample are producers of standardised products (49.0020%), 
followed by service providers (27.8062%), before producers of differentiated products 
(23.1918%). This pattern is similar to that in Hill et al. (2012). 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
                                                            




is positive and significantly related to industry adjusted trade payables (0.2346), sales volatility 
(0.0312), sales growth (0.0595), firm size (0.3716), and leverage (0.0809). In contrast, excess 
return is negative and significantly related to market share (-0.0223), risk (-0.2384), age (-
0.1359), intangible assets (-0.1167) and cash flow (-0.1827). The correlations between the 
independent variables show no indication of multicollinearity as they are all well below the 
threshold of 80% (Field, 2005).  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
4.2 Multivariate regression results and discussion 
Table 4 presents the results of equations (2) to (5).  The results for equation 2 (column 1 of table 
4) show that trade payables have a significantly positive impact on firm performance (0.0288, 
T-Stat = 4.72). This result is consistent with hypothesis 1 and indicates that firms that rely on 
trade payables increase their performance. Specifically, the results indicate that a 10% increase 
in trade payables increases excess return by approximately 0.288%. The economic consequence 
is also quite substantial: a one standard deviation increase in trade payables is related to an 
increase of 2.1286% in excess stock return. Comparatively, this figure is higher than the 1.620% 
reported in a US study by Goto et al. (2015). Theoretically, the result is consistent with 
financing theory, diversion motive theory, and operational efficiency theory, all of which 
predict a positive relationship between trade payables and firm performance (Emery, 1984; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Bhattacharya, 2008; Giannetti et al., 2011; Mateut et al., 2015). The 
result is also consistent with the empirical evidence from Ge and Qiu (2007) as well as Du et 
al. (2012), who emphasise the importance of trade payables to the performance of firms. The 
findings may be DWWULEXWHGWRWKHIDFWWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWKHOSVILUPVWRmaximize production 
(Goto et al., 2015) and also shields them from inefficiencies in the financial market (Rajan and 
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Zingales, 1998). An alternative explanation may be that firms use trade payables to offset the 
lost interest associated with financing credit to customers and improving firms¶ operating cash 
flows (Wu et al., 2012). However, Aktas et al. (2012) showed that relative to cash credit, 
suppliers¶ credit is illiquid and signals managers¶ intentions not to expropriate firm resources 
to outside investors. Therefore, the finding could also imply that investors interpret this signal 
VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW as a reduced agency problem and adjust their valuation upwards.  This 
finding provides an explanation for the existence and prevalent use of trade payables by firms 
and implies that firms receive trade credit from suppliers because it increases performance.  
 To test hypothesis 2, equation (3) is estimated. The results in column (2) of Table 4 
indicate a positive coefficient of the interaction variable (ܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ * CV_Sales) (0.0067, 
T-Stat = 3.43). Specifically, the results are consistent with hypothesis 2 and indicate that a 10% 
increase in trade payables of a firm with no sales volatility is 0.216%, but increases to 0.283% 
(0.216% + 0.067%) for firms with higher variation in sales. This finding demonstrates a higher 
excess return of trade payables in firms with more volatile sales. This result is consistent with 
the assertion that firms with sales volatility rely on VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLQRUGHUWRDGMXVWSURGXFWLRQ
without the need to worry about making immediate payment (Hill et al., 2012).  Hill et al. (2010) 
opined that firms with high sales volatility use more trade payables to improve cash flow. 
Martinez-Sola et al. (2014) documented that trade payables are important to firms with demand 
uncertainty because it helps them smooth production to meet the erratic demand of their 
customers. Consequently, a reasonable explanation for the higher performance of trade 
payables in firms with sales volatility may be that it helps them to balance inventory (Bo, 2011) 
to smooth production to meet customer demands irrespective of their cash flow position. 
Alternatively, the results could imply that trade payables obviate the need for firms with volatile 
sales to raise costly capital at short notice to synchronize production and sales. However, from 
the signalling perspective of Aktas et al. (2012), the results suggest that in times of demand 
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uncertainty, suppliers¶ credit signals PDQDJHUV¶HIIRUWs to smooth production to meet demand. 
Consequently, investors rightly decode the signal and adjust their valuation of the firm upwards.  
 Results for the effect of market share on the trade payables-firm performance 
relationship is presented in column (3) of Table 4. The coefficient of the variable (MktShare) is 
significant (-1.003, T-Stat = -3.62), demonstrating that market share impacts negatively on firm 
performance. This is also consistent with Hill et al. (2012). More importantly, the coefficient 
of the variable of interest (ܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ כ  MktShare) is negative and statistically different 
from zero (-0.0258, T-Stat = -2.38), which confirms hypothesis 3. 
 
Our results suggest that for 
firms with bigger market share, a 10% increase in trade payables reduces excess return by 
0.258%. The result shows that the value of trade payables does depend on the relative market 
share of firms, and that smaller firms benefLWPRUHIURPVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWWKDQELJJHURQHV7KLV
is intuitive because unlike bigger firms, smaller firms have smaller market share and more 
growth opportunities, leading to a greater incentive to increase market share. To achieve this, 
they give out more credit to their customers (Hill et al., 2012). This increase in credit to 
customers is only possible with high institutional finance or an increase in trade payables 
(Molina and Preve, 2009). Nonetheless, although institutional finance is generally cheaper than 
VXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW<DQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOILQDQFHLVOHVVDFFHVVLEOHWRVPDOOHUILUPV3HWHUVHQ
and Rajan, 1997; Baños-Caballero et al., 2014). Therefore, in firms with smaller market share, 
a reliance on trade credit helps increase sales and growth, leading to increased performance. In 
contrast, firms with bigger market share (usually large firms) have less growth opportunities 
but relatively easy access to institutional finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Baños-Caballero 
et al., 2014). The limited growth opportunities and the access to less expensive institutional 
finance make trade payables value decreasing in these firms. From a signalling perspective, the 
results suggest that suppliers¶ credit indicates signal dishonesty in firms with bigger market 
share and causes investors to revise their valuation downwards. 
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 Table 4 (column 4) presents results for the value relevance of the trade payables-
differentiated products interactions. In this section, we adopt the methodology of Hill et al. 
(2012) in order to separately control for the effects of firms producing standardised products 
(base case),  services (Services) as well as producers of differentiated products (DiffProd). The 
results indicate that trade payables are not value relevant to service firms (-0.0002, T-Stat = -
0.98). However, the coefficient of the interaction variable (ܶ݌ܽݕǡ ݆݅݊݀ܽ݀ כ DiffProd) is positive 
and statistically significant (0.0004, T-Stat = 2.86). This result indicates that compared to 
producers of standardised products, producers of differentiated products benefit more from 
trade payables in terms of contribution to firm value. Several reasons may be given for the 
results. Theoretically, the finding is in consonance with the diversion theory argument that firms 
with differentiated products benefit from trade payables (Fabbri and Menichini, 2010).  Mateut 
et al. (2015) document that differentiated products require unique inputs and producers have 
fewer alternative suppliers. Consequently, the results could imply that trade payables increase 
performance by ensuring timely and adequate supply of inputs to match production and sales. 
However, Mateut et al. (2015) note that the limited number of suppliers and buyers of inputs in 
differentiated product industries necessitates the formation of stronger customer relationships. 
These stronger relationships lead to reduced buyer opportunism and lower moral hazard (Bukart 
and Elingsen, 2004; Mateut et al., 2015), and ultimately reduce the cost of inputs. Wilson and 
Summers (2002) note that trade payables can facilitate stronger long-term customer 
relationships. Consequently, the results could imply that producers of differentiated products 
use trade payables to form stronger customer relationships in order to reduce the cost of inputs 
and increase performance.   
 2YHUDOOH[LVWLQJVWXGLHVGRFXPHQWWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWLVWKHQRUPLQLQGXVWULHVWKDW
deal in differentiated products (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Giannetti et al., 2011). Our finding 
suggests that this is the case because trade payables are value increasing in firms that produce 
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differentiated products. We follow the procedure by Aktas et al. (2015) and also test the joint 
significance of all the interaction variables. The letter ߚ in Table 4 represents the coefficient of 
the corresponding variable as indicated in equations (3) to (5). In column 2, the sum of ߚଵ and ߚଷ, which measures the marginal effect of trade payables on performance for firms with sales 
volatility, is statistically significant. In column 3, the sum of ߚଵ and ߚଷ, which measures the 
marginal effect of trade payables on performance for firms with larger market share, is 
statistically significant. Column 4 also presents the results for the sum of ߚଵ and ߚଷ for the 
marginal effect of trade payables on performance of firms that produce differentiated products.  
It shows that the marginal effect of the interaction variable is statistically significant. These 
results further support our main findings.  
 In relation to the control variables, the coefficients of risk, sales growth, firm size, age 
and cash flow are all significant at conventional levels. Excess return decreases with an increase 
in risk (Kieschnick et al., 2013), firm size (Aktas et al., 2015), and age (Aktas et al., 2015). 
Results also indicate that excess return increases with increases in sales growth (Hill et al., 
2012) and cash flow (Aktas et al., 2015). 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
5.          Further Analysis 
5.1 Trade payables versus bank credit and firm performance 
The UHODWLYHYDOXHUHOHYDQFHRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWYHUVXVEDQNFUHGLWKDVDWWUDFWHGDWWHQWLRQLQWKH
literature (Giannetti et al., 2011; Du et al., 2012). However, the empirical evidence so far has 
produced mixed results. For example, whereas Marotta (2005) and Giannetti et al. (2011) 
suggest that trade payables could be cheaper than bank credit, others including Wilner (2000) 
and Kestens et al. (2012) argue in favour of bank credit. In this section, we investigate the 
relative value relevance of trade credit versus bank credit. To do that, we introduce a new 
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variable BKcredit, indadj, which captures industry adjusted bank credit (see, Lin and Chou, 
2015). The results are presented in Table 5. In column (1), the results indicate that bank credit 
has higher firm performance than trade credit as indicated by the coefficients of trade payables 
(0.0281, T-Stat = 4.59) and bank credit (0.0303, T-Stat = 2.87). Economically, a 10% increase 
in trade payables leads to a 0.281% increase in firm performance; while a 10% increase in bank 
credit leads to a 0.303% increase in firm performance. Thus, bank credit is 0.022% more 
profitable than trade credit. This finding is also consistent with Ng et al. (1999). 
 We also re-examine this relationship by taking into account firms with sales volatility, 
differentiated products, and bigger market share. The results are presented in column (2). The 
coefficient of the interaction Tpay,indadj * CV_Sales is (0.0067, T-Stat = 3.41) and of 
BKcredit,indadj * CV_Sales is (-0.0022, T-Stat = -0.27), indicating that firms with sales 
volatility benefit from increases in trade payables but not bank credit. In column (3), the 
coefficients of Tpay,indadj * Mktshare is (-0.0261, T-Stat = -2.42) and that of BKcredit,indadj 
* Mktshare
 
is (0.0091,  T-Stat = 0.56). The findings suggest that when market share is bigger, 
increases in trade payables are value decreasing whilst those of bank credit are not value 
relevant. These indicate that firms with bigger market share may benefit more from bank credit 
relative to trade payables. The last column presents the results regarding the nature of products. 
Once again, the results indicate that firms with differentiated products benefit from trade 
payables (0.0004, T-Stat = 2.88) but not bank credit (0.0000, T-Stat = 0.15). Overall, the results 
LQGLFDWHWKDWWKHUHODWLYHYDOXHUHOHYDQFHRIEDQNFUHGLWYHUVXVVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWGHSHQGVRQWKH
level of sales volatility, market share and the nature of product. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
5.2 Trade payables, financial crisis, and excess return  
The existing literature argues that the value relevance of trade payables may differ in crisis 
periods (Lamberson 1995; Martínez-Sola et al., 2014). This is because financial crisis brings in 
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its trail a reduction in bank credit (Love et al., 2007). Others, including Kestens et al. (2012) 
and McGuinness and Hogan (2016), suggest that financial crisis leads to a decrease in trade 
credit supply (Kestens et al., 2012; McGuinness and Hogan, 2016). We examine the value 
UHOHYDQFHRIVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWGXULQJWKHUHFHQWILQDQFLDOFULVLVDQGKRZWKLVYDULHVDFURVVILUPV
with sales volatility, bigger market share and differentiated products. 
  To achieve this, we create a dummy variable Crisis, which identifies the crisis period 
and is equal to one for the years 2007-2009 and zero otherwise. We then create other 
interactions with the crisis variable. The results are presented in Table 6.  Column (1) shows a 
positive and significant relationship for the interaction Tpay,indadj * crisis (0.0242, T-Stat = 
5.977KLVUHVXOWVXJJHVWVWKDWVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLWZDVYDOXHUHOHYDQWGXULQJWKHILQDQFLDOFULVLV
period. This is intuitive because financial crisis results in credit rationing (Love et al., 2007), 
and with supplier credit, firms can increase performance by continuing production to meet 
customer demands. Nevertheless, this finding is in contrast to Kestens et al. (2012) who 
reported a negative relationship between trade payables and performance during the crisis 
period in Australia. The contrasting results may be attributed to differences in the severity of 
the financial crisis in the UK and Australia. In the UK, the financial crisis resulted in bank 
collapses and huge government bailouts but this was not the case in Australia. In fact, Murphy 
(2011) argued that a combination of market conditions, pre-existing institutional practices and 
government policies sheltered Australian banks during the crisis. Consequently, trade payables 
may be important for the performance and even survival of UK non-financial institutions during 
the crisis period. 
 The results in column (2) show that firms with sales volatility benefit more from trade 
payables during a crisis period as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of the 
interaction variable Tpay,indadj * CV_Sales * crisis (0.0191, T-Stat = 3.56). Interestingly, the 
results in column (3) show that during financial crisis, trade payables enhance the performance 
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of firms with a bigger market share (0.0323, T-Stat = 1.98), which is contrary to Hypothesis 
(3). This highlights the severity of the credit rationing in the UK during the financial crisis. 
7KXV HYHQ ZLWK WKHLU OLPLWHG VDOHV JURZWK RSSRUWXQLWLHV VXSSOLHUV¶ FUHGLW ZDV VWLOO YDOXH
relevant in firms with bigger market share because, without it, they would be unable to satisfy 
existing FXVWRPHUGHPDQGV7KLVDOVRLQGLFDWHVWKDWILUPV¶GHPDQGIRUWUDGHSD\DEOHVGXULQJ
the crisis period was primarily to satisfy existing customers due to the limited access to bank 
financing. Lastly, the results presented in column (4) show that trade payables increased the 
performance of producers of differentiated products (0.0003, T-Stat = 3.95) and service 
providers (0.0003, T-Stat = 3.33) during the financial crisis periods.  
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 
6. Robustness Test  
 6.1 Alternative measure of performance ± ROA 
The study investigates the value relevance of trade payables. Consequently, we followed Aktas 
et al. (2015) and Goto et al. (2015) and employed a market valuation measure (excess return) 
as a proxy for performance. We conduct a further test to evaluate the sensitivity of our results 
to our measure of firm performance.  Specifically, we follow Li et al. (2016) and adopt ROA 
as an alternative measure of firm performance. The results presented in Table 7 are qualitatively 
similar to those in Table 4 and shows that trade payables impact positively on performance. 
Also, trade payables are value increasing in firms with sales volatility and differentiated 
products but value decreasing in firms with bigger market share. These imply that our results 
are robust to an alternative measure of firm performance.   
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
 
6.2 Alternative measures of trade payables ± total assets and sales as deflators 
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We follow Petersen and Rajan (1997), Fisman and Love (2003), Giannetti et al. (2011), Wu et 
al. (2012) and Wu et al. (2014), and test the sensitivity of the baseline results in Table 4 to a 
change in the measurement of the main independent variable by scaling trade payables with 
total assets (in Table 8) and sales (in Table 9) instead of cost of goods sold. Once again, the 
industry/year adjusted trade payables to total assets and sales are used. Tables 8 and 9 report 
the regression results on excess return with the same econometric procedure and set of control 
variables as used in Table 4. The results reported in Tables 8 and 9 yield consistent evidence as 
reported in Table 4.  
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
 [INSERT TABLE 9] 
6.3 Three-year average excess return 
In this section, we test the sensitivity of our baseline results to a long-run performance measure 
by employing a 3-year average excess return. Aktas et al. (2015) used the 3-year average excess 
return to assess whether the effect of trade payables on firm performance is persistent through 
time. Consequently, as a robustness test, we use a 3-year average excess return as a measure of 
long-run performance. The same econometric procedure and set of control variables are used 
as in Table 4. According to Table 10, the results of using a 3-year excess return as the dependent 
variable is qualitatively similar to the 1-year excess returns results reported in Table 4. This 
shows that the effect of trade payables RQILUPV¶H[FHVVUHWXUQs is persistent through time. 
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
 
6.4 Oster test of endogeneity 
Unobserved time-variant and time-invariant omitted variables are of major concern in the 
accounting and finance literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Oster, 2017). In this paper, we 
address the issue of omitted variables by employing an innovative and influential procedure 
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developed by Oster (2017). This technique is new to the accounting and finance literature and 
has so far been applied in recent influential papers to deal with endogeneity concerns (see, 
Aktas et al., 2017; Jha, 2015; Frijns et al., 2016). This is a sensitive-type method used to gauge 
the robustness and validity of the results to omitted variables biases by testing the stability of 
the coefficients. It is based on the assumption that it is possible to determine how large the 
selection on unobservables must be in order to explain away the coefficient of interest, by 
measuring how much the regression coefficients and the model R-squared change with the 
inclusion of extra control variables. To potentially assess the impact of omitted variables on all 
the coefficients of interest in Table 4, we follow the procedure suggested by Oster (2017) and 
applied in Aktas et al. (2017) by assuming that omitted variables and included variables are of 
HTXDO LPSRUWDQFHį , and the inclusion of omitted variables can lead to a maximum R-
squared (Rmax) of 1.3 times the estimated R-squared in the full specification in Table 4. 
 Table 11 contains the results of the Oster (2017) test for all regressions, concentrating 
only on our main explanatory variables. Columns 1 to 3 show the coefficients, confidence 
intervals and R-squared from the main controlled regressions. Column 4 presents the identified 
VHWRIERXQGVRI WKHFRHIILFLHQW IRU WKHFRQWUROOHGVHW ȕDQG WKH IXOO VHW LQFOXGLQJRPLWWHG
variables) ȕUHVSHFWLYHO\:HFDOFXODWHȕEDVHGRQWKHYDOXHVRI5PD[DQGį . Columns 
5 and 6 measure whether the results in the controlled regressions are susceptible to omitted 
variable bias by determining if the bias-DGMXVWHGFRHIILFLHQWȕVDWLVILHVWKHWZRUREXVWQHVV
criteria suggested in Oster (2017). Specifically, column FRQWDLQVDWHVWRIZKHWKHUȕPRYHV
DZD\IURP]HURLQERWKGLUHFWLRQVZKHUHDVFROXPQUHSRUWVDWHVWRIZKHWKHUȕIDOOVZLWKLQ
the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficient ȕ in the main controlled regression. 
 According to the first criteria which test ZKHWKHUȕPRYHVDZD\IURP]HURLQERWK
directions, the results in column 5 indicate that is the case for all our main variables of interest. 
In relation to the second criteria which tests ZKHWKHUȕLVZLWKLQWKHFRQILGHQFHLQtervals 
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of the estimated coefficient in the main controlled regression, the results presented in column 6 
VKRZ WKDW ȕ IRU DOO RXU PDLQ YDULDEOHV RI LQWHUHVW LV ZLWKLQ WKH  LQWHUYDO H[FHSW IRU
(Tpay,indadj*MktShare). Overall, the findings imply that the conclusions drawn from the main 
analysis (controlled regressions) are not affected by omitted variables bias, and therefore 
accurate. Altogether, our results indicate that our main results are robust to the coefficient 
stability methods because ȕof almost all the variables of interest moves away from zero and 
falls within the 95% confidence intervals. This implies that the economic significance of our 
main variables of interest is not affected by the addition of unobserved omitted variables. 
 [INSERT TABLE 11] 
 
7.       Conclusion 
Prior research has mainly focused on only one aspect of trade credit ± trade receivables ± to the 
neglect of the other aspect ± trade payables. This is surprising, given that both types of trade 
credit form the trade credit channel of firms. In this study, we try to fill the gap in the literature 
by examining the relationship between trade payables and firm performance. The few prior 
papers that examined the relationship between trade payables and firm performance in the 
context of developing countries have also not considered how the product market dynamics 
may affect the relationship. First, we examine the relationship between trade payables and firm 
performance. Second, we explore how sales volatility impacts upon the trade payables and firm 
performance relationship. Third, we examine the market share effect on the relationship 
between trade payables and firm performance. Finally, we examine whether the nature of the 
product impacts on the value relevance of trade payables. To do that, we focus on a sample of 
UK firms over a 10-year period between 2005 and 2014. 
 Specifically, we find that an increase in trade payables is positively associated with firm 
performance. Gauging the value of trade payables distinguishes this paper from prior studies 
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which focus on trade receivables. The findings here also contribute to the working capital 
management literature. The salient result of this study is that trade payables enhance firm 
performance, which suggests that firms should be the recipients of trade credit. Moreover, the 
results show that firms with sales volatility or lower market share, and producers of 
differentiated products, have a higher excess return of trade payables. The findings that product 
market dynamics affect the value relevance of trade payables explains why some firms rely on 
trade credit more than others. In addition, it shows that trade payables are more value enhancing 
for some firms than others. Further analysis shows that bank credit is cheaper than trade credit, 
ZKLFKVXJJHVWV WKDWSULRU WR WKHLUHQJDJHPHQWZLWKVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW, firms must explore the 
opportunity of accessing bank credit. Finally, the results show that the effect of trade payables 
is heightened during the financial crisis period.  
 The findings have significant implications for corporate policy. Given the magnitude of 
trade payables RQILUPV¶EDODQFHVKHHWs, the management of corporations should place certain 
importance on exploiting their benefits for the enhancement of shareholder value. Although 
firms should try and minimise WKHFRVWVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKUHO\LQJRQVXSSOLHUV¶FUHGLW, such as lost 
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Table 1. Variable definitions 
Variable  
Acronym Name Definition 
ExcessRet Excess return %X\íDQGíKROGexcess excess return over the calendar 
year defined as: ௜ ൌ  ? ሺ ? ൅ ௜ܴ௧ሻି௧்ୀଵ  ? ሺ ? ൅ ௕ܴ௧ሻ௧்ୀଵ , where 
Ri,m and Rp,m are the return for firm I and the return of 
the benchmark portfolio for month m. Benchmark 
SRUWIROLRV DUH WKH WZHQW\íILYH )DPDí)UHQFK
YDOXHíZHLJKWHG SRUWIROLRV EDVHG RQ VL]H DQG
ERRNíWRíPDUNHW 
 
Tpay Trade Payables Trade payables scaled by cost of goods sold 
Tpay,indadj Industry adjusted 
trade payables 
Trade payables minus industry average trade payables 
BKcredit Bank credit The ratio of short-term debt to total assets 
BKcredit,indadj Industry adjusted 
bank credit 
Bank credit minus industry average bank credit 
CV_Sales CV_Sales 7KHVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQRIDILUP¶VDQQXDOVDOHVRYHU the 
previous three years period. The sales volatility measure 
is scaled by total assets.  
MktShare Market share Market share is firm sales divided by aggregate industry 
sales in a given year. 
DiffProd Differentiated 
Products 
An indicator variable equal to one if the firm produces 
differentiated products, and zero otherwise. 
 
Services Services Services is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is 
a service provider, and zero otherwise. 
StandProd Standardised 
Products 
StandProd is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
produces standard products, and zero otherwise. 
Risk Risk  The standard deviation of daily excess return. In the 
regression analyzes, I use the annualized standard 
deviation of daily excess returns. 
Sales growth Sales growth 2QHí\HDU JURZWK UDWH RI VDOHV DW WLPH W-1: 
(SALEtí6$/(Wí)/ SALEWí 
Firm size Firm size Total assets of firms  
Age Age Number of years between incorporation and the calendar 
year end of each firm. 
Leverage Leverage Total debt, scaled by total assets. 
Crisis Financial crises An indicator variable equal to one for the years 2007, 
2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. 
Intangible assets Intangible assets Intangible assets, scaled by total assets.  
Cash flow Cash flow Operating income before extraordinary items plus 











Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable            N Mean  Median SD p25 p90 
ExcessRet 20087 1.4023 2.0378 3.8918 -0.6185 6.5035 ܶ݌ܽݕ, indadj 20891 0.0000 2.5751 73.9103 -4.3363 16.4555 
CV_Sales 16887 16.7905 4.6349 50.7325 -2.6349 60.6848 
MktShare 20891 0.1436 0.0488 0.5136 0.0282 0.2810 
StandProd 20891 49.0020 0.0000 49.9912 0.0000 100.00 
Services 20891 27.8062 0.0000 44.8055 0.0000 100.00 
DiffProd 20891 23.1918 0.0000 42.2067 0.0000 100.00 
Risk 20225 3.8369 3.9158 0.6423 3.5292 4.5432 
Sales growth 20891 3.0627 3.0395 1.9021 2.5395 5.0013 
Firm size
 
(log) 20891 12.0975 12.2121 3.5555 9.6353 15.6346 
Age  20733 12.0228 12.8927 2.2814 10.9434 14.0124 
Leverage
 
 17254 14.0401 10.0788 14.2124 0.3699 35.9433 
Intangible assets 20720 10.9480 2.6760 13.0619 1.3410 24.1085 
Cash flow 20472 -5.9006 -12.2252 17.6685 -16.9314 15.1844 
 
This Table provides descriptive statistics for 2,559 UK listed firms over the period 2005±2014. 







Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ExcessRet 1  
         ܶ݌ܽݕ indadj 0.2346* 1  
        
CV_Sales 0.0312* 0.0515* 1  
       
MktShare ±0.0223* ±0.0231* ±0.0758* 1  
      
Risk ±0.2384* ±0.2892* ±0.0209* 0.0041 1  
     
Sales growth
 
 0.0595* 0.0330* 0.0684* ±0.0006 ±0.0236* 1  
    
Firm size 0.3716* 0.0626* ±0.0075 ±0.0022 ±0.3274* 0.0696* 1  
   
Age  ±0.1359* 0.0813* ±0.0408* 0.0262* 0.1867* ±0.0235* ±0.5138* 1  
  
Leverage 0.0809* ±0.1614* ±0.0429* ±0.0065 ±0.4460* 0.0200* 0.3273* ±0.2568* 1  
 
Intangible assets ±0.1167* ±0.0746* 0.0303* 0.0028 0.3818*  0.0008 ±0.2179* 0.1893* ±0.1656* 1  
Cash flow ±0.1827* ±0.0732* ±0.0218* 0.0023 0.2085* ±0.0219* ±0.3843* 0.2347* ±0.2709* 0.3350* 1 
 
7KLV7DEOHSUHVHQWVWKH3HDUVRQ¶VFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWVfor the dependent and independent variables. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 




 Table 4. Trade payables and excess return 




0.0288*** 0.0216*** 0.0325*** 0.0203** 
 (4.72) (3.05) (4.95) (2.52) 
CV_Sales  0.0783   
  (0.91)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales  0.0067***   
  (3.43)   
MktShare   í1.003***  
   (í3.62)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.0258**  
   (í2.38)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    í0.0002 
    (í0.98) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0004*** 
    (2.86) 
Risk í0.5500*** í0.8710*** í0.5490*** í0.5510*** 
 (í4.14) (í5.11) (í4.13) (í4.15) 
Sales growth 0.0836*** 0.0976*** 0.0846*** 0.0839*** 
 (4.75) (5.86) (4.78) (4.78) 
Firm size í0.0518** í0.0399 í0.0514** í0.0521** 
 (í2.34) (í1.64) (í2.32) (í2.35) 
Age í0.0927*** í0.0575 í0.0936*** í0.0932*** 
 (í3.04) (í1.15) (í3.06) (í3.06) 
Leverage í0.0062 í0.0081 í0.0058 í0.0064 
 (í1.41) (í1.48) (í1.31) (í1.44) 
Intangible assets í0.0034 í0.0024 í0.0035 í0.0027 
 (í0.87) (í0.55) (í0.90) (í0.68) 
Cash flow 0.0187*** 0.0213*** 0.0189*** 0.0185*** 
 (5.04) (4.68) (5.11) (5.05) 
Constant 5.6120*** 7.001*** 5.7190*** 5.6230*** 
 (7.96) (7.25) (8.10) (7.98) 
Firm and year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
$GMXVWHG5íVTXDUH 0.5295 0.5484 0.5299 0.5305 
F±statistic 35.49*** 33.92*** 33.79*** 32.37*** 
N 14,110 11,159 14,110 14,110 E?૚ + E?૜  15.32*** 12.32*** 3.22** 
 
This Table presents the results of the relationship between trade payables and excess return. All 
regressions are run with robust standard errors to reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is excess return. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. ȕrefers to the coefficient estimates as defined in equations 2-5. 
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Table 5. Trade payables vs bank credit and excess return 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tpay, indadj 0.0281*** 0.0208*** 0.0318*** 0.0194** 
 (4.59) (2.93) (4.83) (2.39) 
BKcredit, indadj 0.0303*** 0.0302** 0.0298*** 0.0308*** 
 (2.87) (2.52) (2.79) (2.73) 
CV_Sales  0.1070   
  (0.78)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales  0.0067***   
  (3.41)   
BKcredit, indadj * CV_Sales  í0.0022   
  (í0.27)   
MktShare   í0.9220***  
   (í2.72)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.0261**  
   (í2.42)  
BKcredit, indadj * MktShare   0.0091  
   (0.56)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    í0.0002 
    (í0.97) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0004*** 
    (2.88) 
BKcredit, indadj * Services    í0.0000 
    (í0.02) 
BKcredit, indadj * DiffProd    0.0000 
    (0.15) 
Risk í0.6380*** í0.9470*** í0.6370*** í0.6400*** 
 (í4.63) (í5.49) (í4.63) (í4.65) 
Sales growth 0.0837*** 0.0975*** 0.0847*** 0.0840*** 
 (4.76) (5.84) (4.79) (4.80) 
Firm size í0.0530** í0.0424* í0.0526** í0.0533** 
 (í2.39) (í1.74) (í2.37) (í2.41) 
Age í0.0970*** í0.0629 í0.0977*** í0.0976*** 
 (í3.19) (í1.26) (í3.21) (í3.21) 
Leverage 0.0236** 0.0210 0.0246** 0.0243** 
 (2.16) (1.63) (2.25) (2.20) 
Intangible assets í0.0021 í0.0014 í0.0022 í0.0014 
 (í0.55) (í0.32) (í0.57) (í0.35) 
Cash flow 0.0186*** 0.0211*** 0.0188*** 0.0184*** 
 (5.05) (4.64) (5.10) (5.04) 
Constant 5.5180*** 6.9040*** 5.6090*** 5.5260*** 
 (7.88) (7.17) (8.00) (7.87) 
Firm and Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
$GMXVWHG5íVTXDUH 0.5300 0.5487 0.5304 0.5309 
F±statistic 34.22*** 31.06*** 31.45*** 28.52*** 
N 14,110 11,159 14,110 14,110 
 
This Table presents the results of the effects of trade payables and bank credit on excess return. 
All regressions are run with robust standard errors to reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent 
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variable in all regressions is excess return. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 










Table 6. Trade payables, financial crisis and excess return 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tpay, indadj 0.0458*** 0.0229*** 0.0335*** 0.0201** 
 (6.78) (3.22) (5.05) (2.48) 
CV_Sales  í0.0193   
  (í0.23)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales  0.0138***   
  (4.81)   
Tpay, indadj * Crisis 0.0242***    
 (5.97)    
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales * Crisis  0.0191***   
  (3.56)   
MktShare   í0.8580***  
   (í2.87)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.0098  
   (í0.91)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare * Crisis   0.0323**  
   (1.98)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    0.0000 
    (0.57) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0006*** 
    (4.15) 
Tpay, indadj * Services * Crisis    0.0003*** 
    (3.33) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd * Crisis    0.0003*** 
    (3.95) 
Crisis  í0.1680 í0.6170*** í0.2270** í0.1820* 
 (í1.57) (í6.39) (í2.10) (í1.71) 
Risk í0.5580*** í0.8670*** í0.5460*** í0.5630*** 
 (í4.18) (í5.09) (í4.11) (í4.23) 
Sales growth 0.0841*** 0.0991*** 0.0842*** 0.0847*** 
 (4.77) (5.91) (4.77) (4.82) 
Firm size í0.0537** í0.0396 í0.0515** í0.0535** 
 (í2.42) (í1.63) (í2.33) (í2.42) 
Age í0.0855*** í0.0562 í0.0933*** í0.0890*** 
 (í2.80) (í1.13) (í3.05) (í2.92) 
Leverage í0.0066 í0.0080 í0.0058 í0.0067 
 (í1.48) (í1.46) (í1.31) (í1.52) 
Intangible assets í0.0034 í0.0025 í0.0035 í0.0028 
 (í0.89) (í0.58) (í0.90) (í0.72) 
Cash flow 0.0189*** 0.0213*** 0.0190*** 0.0185*** 
 (5.04) (4.69) (5.14) (5.03) 
Constant 5.7860*** 6.3750*** 5.9230*** 5.8430*** 
 (7.96) (6.49) (8.12) (8.04) 
Firm and year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R ± square  0.5313 0.5487 0.5302 0.5318 
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F ± statistic  34.38*** 31.75*** 31.33*** 29.95*** 
N 14,110 11,159 14,110 14,110 
 
This Table presents the results of the relationship between trade payables and excess return 
augmented with financial crisis. All regressions are run with robust standard errors to reduce 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable in all regressions is excess return. All variables are as 
defined in Table 1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 


























Table 7. Trade payables and return on Assets 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Tpay, indadj 0.1060*** 0.0729** 0.1240*** 0.0209 
 (3.38) (2.02) (3.61) (0.43) 
CV_Sales  í0.230   
  (í0.22)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales   0.0403**   
  (2.45)   
MktShare   0.0607  
   (0.04)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.117**  
   (í2.13)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    0.0573 
    (0.87) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0027*** 
    (3.38) 
Risk í1.7970*** í2.7810*** í1.8020*** í1.8090*** 
 (í3.82) (í4.24) (í3.82) (í3.85) 
Sales growth 0.2980*** 0.3670*** 0.2970*** 0.3000*** 
 (4.44) (6.19) (4.39) (4.47) 
Firm size í0.1930** í0.1850* í0.1850** í0.1880** 
 (í2.30) (í1.85) (í2.21) (í2.25) 
Age í0.4400*** í0.4040 í0.4420*** í0.4300*** 
 (í3.17) (í1.63) (í3.18) (í3.13) 
Leverage í0.0218 í0.0193 í0.0213 í0.0217 
 (í1.25) (í0.94) (í1.22) (í1.25) 
Intangible assets í0.0069 í0.0020 í0.0071 í0.0061 
 (í0.45) (í0.11) (í0.46) (í0.40) 
Cash flow 0.1250*** 0.1370*** 0.1250*** 0.1240*** 
 (4.92) (5.04) (4.96) (4.96) 
Constant 23.4200*** 28.5900*** 23.3300*** 23.2900*** 
 (8.33) (6.53) (8.33) (8.33) 
Firm and Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R±square 0.5412 0.5527 0.5414 0.5426 
F±statistic 19.67*** 19.03*** 18.15*** 18.52*** 
N 14,019 11,079 14,019 14,019 
 
This Table presents the results of the relationship between trade payables and return on assets. 
All regressions are run with robust standard errors to reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is return on assets. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 





Table 8. Alternative measure of trade payables (total assets as deflator) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tpay, indadj 0.0209*** 0.0192*** 0.0234*** 0.0156*** 
 (5.08) (4.09) (5.40) (2.83) 
CV_Sales  0.137*   
  (1.66)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales  0.0043***   
  (3.14)   
MktShare   í0.8170**  
   (í2.57)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.0181**  
   (í2.24)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    í0.0000 
    (í0.20) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0003** 
    (2.43) 
Risk í0.5470*** í0.8540*** í0.5440*** í0.5410*** 
 (í4.10) (í5.03) (í4.09) (í4.07) 
Sales growth 0.0823*** 0.0957*** 0.0832*** 0.0824*** 
 (4.64) (5.64) (4.66) (4.67) 
Firm size í0.0531** í0.0387 í0.0532** í0.0528** 
 (í2.40) (í1.60) (í2.40) (í2.39) 
Age í0.0876*** í0.0545 í0.0880*** í0.0884*** 
 (í2.87) (í1.10) (í2.88) (í2.87) 
Leverage í0.0064 í0.0079 í0.0060 í0.0060 
 (í1.43) (í1.44) (í1.35) (í1.36) 
Intangible assets í0.0022 í0.0016 í0.0023 í0.0021 
 (í0.58) (í0.38) (í0.59) (í0.55) 
Cash flow 0.0179*** 0.0210*** 0.0180*** 0.0180*** 
 (4.78) (4.62) (4.83) (4.87) 
Constant 5.4980*** 6.8090*** 5.5860*** 5.4810*** 
 (7.75) (7.04) (7.86) (7.71) 
Firm and Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
$GMXVWHG5íVTXDUH 0.5296 0.5490 0.5300 0.5301 
F±statistic 35.99*** 34.64*** 33.58*** 32.42*** 
N 14,110 11,159 14,110 14,110 
 
This Table presents the results of the relationship between trade payables and excess return 
augmented with a different measure of trade payables. All regressions are run with robust 
standard errors to reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable in all regressions is excess 
return. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, 






Table 9. Alternative measure of trade payables (sales as deflator) 




0.0194*** 0.0139*** 0.0220*** 0.0178*** 
 (4.96) (3.18) (5.27) (3.31) 
CV_Sales  0.157**   
  (2.09)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales  0.0048***   
  (3.01)   
MktShare   í1.1750***  
   (í4.05)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.0174**  
   (í2.23)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    í0.0001 
    (í1.46) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0002* 
    (1.83) 
Risk í0.5640*** í0.8840*** í0.5600*** í0.5650*** 
 (í4.22) (í5.15) (í4.20) (í4.24) 
Sales growth 0.0847*** 0.1000*** 0.0855*** 0.0848*** 
 (4.72) (5.82) (4.74) (4.74) 
Firm size í0.0557** í0.0414* í0.0554** í0.0568** 
 (í2.50) (í1.69) (í2.49) (í2.56) 
Age í0.0925*** í0.0639 í0.0940*** í0.0933*** 
 (í3.04) (í1.29) (í3.08) (í3.07) 
Leverage í0.0062 í0.0081 í0.0057 í0.0063 
 (í1.37) (í1.45) (í1.28) (í1.42) 
Intangible assets í0.0039 í0.0025 í0.0041 í0.0029 
 (í1.00) (í0.57) (í1.06) (í0.74) 
Cash flow 0.0189*** 0.0215*** 0.0190*** 0.0187*** 
 (5.06) (4.71) (5.10) (5.01) 
Constant 6.0120*** 7.3290*** 6.1510*** 6.0240*** 
 (8.51) (7.56) (8.69) (8.52) 
Firm and year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
$GMXVWHG5íVTXDUH 0.5297 0.5481 0.5301 0.5302 
F±statistic 35.36*** 33.46*** 34.16*** 32.31*** 
N 13,949 11,010 13,949 13,949 
 
This Table presents the results of the relationship between trade payables and excess return. 
All regressions are run with robust standard errors to reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is excess return. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 








0.0248*** 0.0202*** 0.0285*** 0.0157** 
 (4.85) (3.35) (5.20) (2.40) 
CV_Sales  0.0732   
  (1.48)   
Tpay, indadj * CV_Sales  0.0027*   
  (1.93)   
MktShare   í0.9490***  
   (í4.25)  
Tpay, indadj * MktShare   í0.0256***  
   (í3.40)  
Tpay, indadj * Services    í0.0000 
    (í0.00) 
Tpay, indadj * DiffProd    0.0003*** 
    (2.70) 
Risk í0.2000* í0.3250** í0.1970 í0.2030* 
 (í1.65) (í2.29) (í1.63) (í1.68) 
Sales growth 0.0780*** 0.0782*** 0.0785*** 0.0782*** 
 (6.58) (6.11) (6.64) (6.57) 
Firm size í0.0268 í0.0020 í0.0263 í0.0267 
 (í1.49) (í0.11) (í1.46) (í1.49) 
Age í0.0902*** í0.0279 í0.0908*** í0.0900*** 
 (í3.37) (í0.70) (í3.38) (í3.38) 
Leverage í0.0091** í0.0107*** í0.0086** í0.0093*** 
 (í2.56) (í2.72) (í2.43) (í2.61) 
Intangible assets í0.0044 í0.0019 í0.0045 í0.0042 
 (í1.41) (í0.64) (í1.43) (í1.30) 
Cash flow 0.0179*** 0.0215*** 0.0180*** 0.0178*** 
 (6.18) (6.56) (6.24) (6.20) 
Constant 4.0380*** 4.2140*** 4.1300*** 4.0510*** 
 (6.55) (5.32) (6.69) (6.58) 
Firm and year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
$GMXVWHG5íVTXDUH 0.7477 0.7935 0.7483 0.7482 
F±statistic 34.96*** 29.36*** 33.47*** 31.46*** 
N 11,985 9,180 11,985 11,985 
 
This Table presents the results of the relationship between trade payables and excess return. 
All regressions are run with robust standard errors to reduce heteroscedasticity. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is excess return. All variables are as defined in Table 1. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 




Table 11. Coefficient Stability Method ± Omitted Variable Bias Test 
 Controlled regression Uncontrolled regression Interpretation 




Table Regression Variables 
Coefficient  
from the  
regression 
95% confidence  




of the  
regression 
 
Identified set of bounds  





away from  
zero 
Coefficient falls 
within the 95% 
confidence  
intervals 
4 Column 1 Tpay,indadj   0.0288   0.0169     0.0408 0.5295   0.0288          0.0362 Yes Yes 
 Column 2 Tpay,indadj*CV_Sales   0.0067   0.0028     0.0105 0.5484   0.0067          0.0100 Yes Yes 
 Column 3 Tpay,indadj*MktShare í íí 0.5299 í Yes No 
 Column 4 Tpay,indadj*Services í í0.0005     0.0002 0.5305 í Yes Yes 
 Column 4 Tpay,indadj*DiffProd   0.0004   0.0001     0.0007 0.5305   0.0004          0.0006 Yes Yes 
 
This Table presents the results of the test for potential omitted variables following the approach of Oster (2017). As recommended by Oster (2017). We run the 
methods of coefficient stability for our main regressions in Table 4. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the coefficients, confidence intervals and the R-squared from the 
main regressions. Columns (5) and (6) report whether the bias-adjusted coefficient ߚכin the identified set bounds meets the two robustness criteria in Oster (2017), 
specifically column (5) reports if the bias adjusted coefficient moves further away from zero and column (6) reports whether the changes in the adjusted coefficient 
fall within the 95% confidence intervals of the estimated coefficient ȕin the main regression. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
